Liquidity a¤ects various capital market outcomes such as expected returns and capital structure. Prior research has shown that an important determinant of liquidity is volatility, where higher stock return volatility is associated with higher illiquidity. Using recent developments in the literature, we revisit this relation and decompose total volatility into its jump and di¤usive components and argue that the two volatility components are predicted to have di¤erent e¤ects on liquidity. This decomposition is motivated by the fact that variation in the structure of volatility across …rms is driven by variation in information environments. This raises a new unexplored channel, independent of information asymmetry and total volatility, through which the information environment can shape liquidity. We …nd that the positive relation between total volatility and illiquidity is exclusively driven by the jump component, and is independent of any information asymmetry e¤ects. In contrast, we …nd a negative relation between di¤usive volatility and illiquidity. We show that this negative relation is driven by the positive association between di¤usive volatility and trading activity. Finally, we show that these …ndings translate to di¤erential e¤ects on liquidity risk and premium for the jump and di¤usive volatility components. Our …ndings have implications for the understanding of asset prices, corporate …nance decisions and policy-makers.
Introduction
Stock liquidity and its variation a¤ect a number of capital market outcomes such as expected returns (e.g., Amihud and Mendelson, 1986 and Pastor and Stambaugh, 2003; Acharya and Pedersen, 2005) , capital structure (e.g., Lipson and Mortal, 2009 ), dividend policy (Banerjee et al., 2007) , and ownership structure (e.g., Bhide, 1993) . Given these important implications, numerous theoretical and empirical studies have investigated the determinants of liquidity and demonstrated the role stock return volatility plays in driving illiquidity (e.g., Stoll, 1978a; Stoll 1978b; Stoll 2000; Amihud and Mendelson, 1989; Bao and Pan, 2013) .
However, treating volatility as a uniform measure with a homogeneous impact on liquidity overlooks the subtle, yet potentially important, structure of total volatility. More recent developments in the asset pricing literature treat stock returns as a jump-di¤usion process, that is, as a combination of a continuous Brownian motion component and a discontinuous jump component. Consequently, this approach implies that the total return variance is an aggregate outcome of two separate sources that have very di¤erent characteristics. While volatility patterns generated by a discontinuous jump process arise from infrequent, large, isolated price changes, the di¤usive volatility arises from smooth, continuous, small price changes. The overall volatility is merely the integration of these two types of volatility.
The decomposition of total volatility into its jump and di¤usive components is not a mere "technical" exercise, but is motivated by an important economic reasoning. Each volatility component is driven by di¤erent economic forces related to the rate of information arrival. Stocks for which information ‡ows in a smoother and more continuous way are more likely to be governed by a di¤usive process. On the other hand, stocks for which information arrives in a bulky, discontinuous way are more likely to be subject to jumps (e.g., Maheu and McCurdy, 2004) . The rate of information arrival for each …rm is determined by its information environment which is governed by various factors, such as the disclosure regulations that applies to it, its voluntary disclosure policy, and its level of analysts coverage. 1 Relating the …rm's information environment to capital market outcomes has been a central theme in the literature that examines the role of information in capital markets. Numerous studies in accounting and …nance emphasized its importance to liquidity and liquidity driven 1 In a companion study we con…rm this intuition by showing that issuing management forecasts, increasing their number, and having greater analyst coverage all reduce jump volatility. Moreover, following Kelly and Ljungqvist (2012) , we use drops in analyst coverage as a result of an exogenous brokerage house closures to show that a reduction in analyst coverage causally increases jump volatility. The results of the companion study are replicated in the sample of the current study and provided in Appendix A. outcomes (e.g., Kelly and Ljungqvist, 2012; Balakrishnan, Billings, Kelly, and Ljungqvist, 2014) . However, the information environment can give rise to multiple channels that shape liquidity, where the existing literature has so far focused on the channels of information asymmetry and total volatility.
We emphasize a new unexplored channel through which the information environment can shape liquidity and liquidity driven expected returns. We highlight that the information environment also works through the structure of volatility to shape liquidity and liquidity driven outcomes, independently of the already explored channels of information asymmetry and total volatility. The information environment determines the pace at which information arrives to the market and, consequently, a¤ects the relative dominance of the jump versus the di¤usive component of volatility. Hence, as we argue in this paper, since each volatility component impacts liquidity di¤erently, …rms with di¤erent information environments are likely to have di¤erent levels of liquidity. That is, even in the absence of any di¤erences in information asymmetry or total volatility across …rms, di¤erences in their information environments can still a¤ect liquidity di¤erently through their e¤ect on the structure of volatility.
2 Moreover, this channel implies that di¤erences in information environments create di¤erences in liquidity even in the absence of any information asymmetry at all.
The literature on jumps has highlighted two facts that lead to di¤erential predictions for each volatility component on liquidity. These facts are directly linked to the theory of liquidity, which emphasizes the risks market makers face in determining liquidity. The …rst fact is that jumps in prices are di¢ cult to hedge, unlike di¤usive changes (e.g., Garleanu et al., 2009) . Market-makers bear the risk of price changes to their stock inventories, which they must maintain. Therefore, bid-ask spreads are set to compensate them for bearing this inventory risk (e.g., Stoll 1978a; Amihud and Mendelson, 1980; Ho and Stoll, 1981; Ho and Stoll, 1983) . In a di¤usive environment market-makers can control their potential losses, update their inventory portfolios, and …x "stop-loss" rules in a more ‡exible and gradual manner compared to a trading environment that exhibits infrequent dramatic price changes. That is, jumps impose a more restrictive set of risk management tools and stopping rules compared to di¤usive price changes. Similarly, to reduce inventory risk, market-makers often hedge their inventories with correlated instruments, such as options and other correlated stocks or ETFs. Therefore, it is mainly the non-hedgeable portion of their inventory that drives their compensation in the form of bid-ask spreads (e.g., Benston and Hagerman 1974; Ho and Stoll, 1983; Froot and Stein 1998; Naik and Yadav, 2003a; Naik and Yadav, 2003b) . Jump risk, as a discontinuous price change, cannot be easily hedged away, as dynamic replicating strategies become infeasible under incomplete markets (e.g., Garleanu et al., 2009; Jameson and Wilhelm, 1992; Gromb and Vayanos, 2002; Chen et al., 2014) . Therefore, as the non-hedgeable portion of total volatility, it is the jump-driven component that market-makers are likely to demand compensation for.
The second fact is that di¤usive volatility is associated with increased trading, while jump volatility is not (e.g., Giot et al., 2010) . Higher turnover rates reduce market-makers' inventory costs and therefore increase liquidity (Stoll 1978a ). This line of reasoning entails a negative association between di¤usive volatility and illiquidity through turnover.
Taken together, these reasons suggest a positive relation between jump volatility and illiquidity, while a weaker relation, or even a negative one, is expected between di¤usive volatility and illiquidity.
To address these predictions, we follow standard methodologies implemented and validated by Ait-Sahalia (2004) and others to …t a log-normal jump-di¤usion process to all stocks listed on the NYSE and NASDAQ from 2002-2011. We estimate the parameters of the jump and di¤usive processes, measure total return variance, and disentangle the respective contribution of the jump and di¤usive volatility components to total variance. As AitSahalia (2004) points out, this methodology can perfectly disentangle the di¤usive and jump components. Then, using Fama-MacBeth regressions we test for the potential impact each class of volatility has on bid-ask spreads. 4 We …nd that the relation between volatility and bid-ask spreads is exclusively driven by the jump component. These results are independent of any information asymmetry e¤ects as they are maintained in all levels of information asymmetry and remain robust to the inclusion of a proxy for information asymmetry as a control variable. In contrast, we show that the di¤usive component is negatively associated with illiquidity. Gauging the economic magnitude of their e¤ects, an increase of one standard deviation in the jump-driven volatility component increases bid-ask spreads by approximately 30 basis points, whereas an equivalent increase in the di¤usive volatility component decreases bid-ask spreads by approximately 10 basis points. We show that this negative association is fully driven by the relation between di¤usive volatility and turnover. After accounting for trading activity, di¤usive volatility has negligible economic e¤ects. Finally, we show that our results are unlikely to be driven by reverse causality. Since our …ndings are maintained at all levels of turnover, it is unlikely that merely thin trading fully drives our …ndings.
One possible implication of the di¤erential results that each liquidity component has on liquidity, is that it may also carry over to liquidity risk and liquidity risk premiums. A number of studies (e.g., Pastor and Stambaugh, 2003; Sadka, 2006) have shown that liquidity risk is priced. These studies show how stock liquidity is sensitive to aggregate market liquidity and market performance. Therefore, investors demand higher risk premiums for stocks that su¤er from greater illiquidity in times of stress, times in which they also exhibit large losses in wealth. In the context of our analysis, since the jump-volatility component is the dominant driver behind illiquidity, it is possible it would also be the main driver determining liquidity risk and liquidity risk premiums.
We …nd that the jump volatility component has a positive and statistically signi…cant e¤ect for various measures of liquidity risk. On the other hand, the di¤usive component has a negative e¤ect on liquidity risk. That is, only jump volatility increases liquidity risk while di¤usive volatility does not. Furthermore, following the methodology of Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) , we show that only the jump volatility component increases the priced liquidity risk.
Our study contributes to several streams of literature. First, our study contributes to the understanding of the economic forces behind illiquidity. Although prior literature emphasized the importance of information environment to liquidity (e.g., Kelly and Ljungqvist, 2012; Balakrishnan et al., 2014) , we are the …rst to document its e¤ect through the structure of volatility. Relatedly, our …ndings suggest that …rms can improve their liquidity and cost of capital if they are able to enhance their information environment in a way that reduces jump volatility. 5 Second, our study contributes to the literature that studies the determinants of liquidity, particularly that which documents the relation between volatility and liquidity (Stoll, 1978a; Stoll 1978b; Stoll 2000; Amihud and Mendel-son, 1989) . Our study enhances this literature by being the …rst to document that the structure of volatility matters for illiquidity in addition to raw levels of volatility. Third, our study contributes to the literature that studies the consequences of jumps to a variety of …nancial variables. This literature documented that jump and di¤usion processes have very di¤erent e¤ects on credit risk (e.g., Zhou 2001; Cremers, Driessen and Maenhout 2008) , on market beta (e.g., Todorov and Bollerslev 2010; Cremers, Halling and Weinbaum 2015; Bollerslev, Li, and Todorov 2016) , and on stock option pricing (e.g., Du¢ e, Pan and Singleton 2000; Pan 2002; Garleanu, Pederson and Poteshman 2009) . Our study adds to this literature by providing evidence that the jump and di¤usive components of volatility have very di¤erent e¤ects on liquidity. Fourth, our study contributes to the literature on liquidity risk (e.g., Pastor and Stambaugh, 2003) by showing that the jump and di¤usive e¤ects on liquidity also carry over to liquidity risk and premiums.
Moreover, our …ndings also have regulatory implications to security markets. Our results show that implementing accounting policies that encourage more continuous information disclosure may help increase liquidity. These considerations are relevant to reforms currently being implemented to the regulatory environment in the EU. The European Commission recently removed the obligation to publish interim management statements and announced its intention to abolish quarterly …nancial reports for publicly traded companies, steps that might have important consequences to liquidity. More generally policies that increase the continuous stream of information to the markets (e.g, enhanced media coverage, social media discussions) and price informativeness are likely to improve the di¤usion component of volatility and improve liquidity.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe our methodology and empirical approach followed by our data sources and descriptive statistics. Sections 5 describes our results and discusses additional robustness tests. Implications to liquidity risk and premium are addressed in Section 6 and Section 7 concludes.
Methodology

Model Description and Calibration
In our analysis, we follow a standard framework for modeling jump-di¤usion processes and apply estimation procedures that were used, validated and empirically tested in numerous studies (e.g., Ait-Sahalia, 2004; Yu, 2007) . 6 Following Merton (1976) , we assume a continuous trading market for a stock with price S t at time t, in which there are three sources of uncertainty: a standard Brownian motion W t , an independent Poisson process of jump events N t with intensity , and a random jump size Z t which is distributed lognormally with mean and variance 2 . The stock return dynamics are described by the following stochastic di¤erential equation:
where and are constants, E (Z t 1) is the expected relative jump of S t , and J t (Z t 1) N t denotes the compound Poisson process.
7 Following Merton (1976) and Navas (2003) , the di¤usive and jump components of total return variance can be expressed in terms of the respective process parameters as,
which allow for easily calculating the values of the variance components. The total return variance is just the summation of these two components, 
Empirical Analysis
We estimate Fama-MacBeth regressions to formally test for di¤erent in ‡uences each type of variance has on liquidity. We …rst con…rm that indeed total volatility has a positive e¤ect on bid-ask spreads in our sample, as previous studies have shown. Therefore we run the 7 We follow vast prior literature and do not model volatility as a stochastic process as some studies do. Although stochastic volatility makes the model more "realistic" it adds unnecessary complexity at the expense of tractability in the context of the current study. Moreover, simulation analysis reveals that the correlation between our estimated jump and di¤usion parameters in a model with stochastic volatility to a model without stochastic volatility is 0.9 and therefore suggests that there is very little bene…t for the additional complexity. 8 An alternative valid way to estimate jump parameters is to use option prices (e.g., Yan, 2011; Cremers, Halling and Weinbaum, 2015) . However, many stocks do not have available options for trade. Moreover, trading and quotes are very "thin" and illiquid for other stock options. Therefore, to gain a better coverage of the market, and particularly to study liquidity and liquidity risk implications, we chose our methodology.
following cross-section regression year-by-year
where the dependent variable Liq i;t+1 denotes the relative bid-ask spread (in percent) for stock i in the following year t + 1. 9 The explanatory variables on the right-hand side include total variance V i;t , J control variables Control j i;t for j = 1; :::; J, and an error term " i;t , all measured for stock i in year t (January 1 to December 31). This cross-section regression is estimated year-by-year, and then time-series averages are calculated for all coe¢ cients, following the Fama-MacBeth method. Therefore this procedure yields a vector of estimates = 0 ; :::; 1+J that characterizes the variables'e¤ect on liquidity.
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Control variables include the log of market-capitalization and average turnover rate for stock i in year t. Stoll (1978a, b) , Jameson and Wilhelm (1992) , and others have shown that bid-ask spreads depend on expected holding duration, as more trading decreases the duration of risk exposure. Therefore we expect to …nd a negative relation between turnover and illiquidity. As we discussed above, volatility and turnover exhibit a positive relation. Therefore we estimate this regression twice, once including turnover and once without, to gauge the indirect impact total volatility has on illiquidity through turnover.
In the next step, we explicitly include in the model the decomposition of total variance into its jump and di¤usion-driven components. Therefore the new speci…cation is
where the explanatory variables V d i;t and V j i;t , the di¤usion-and jump-driven variance components, respectively, replace the total variance V i;t in Equation (4). Both V d i;t and V j i;t are obtained from the ML estimation. All other variables in the new speci…cation remain unchanged. Again, we estimate this regression twice, once including turnover and once without, to gauge the indirect impact each volatility component has on illiquidity through turnover. 9 In our speci…cation we test for lagged e¤ects since for any decision made in year t+1 the only information available is from year t. However, in unreported results we repeated all our regressions using contemporaneous variables instead of lagged ones and …nd the same e¤ects. 10 The fact that market-makers face high-frequency intra-day inventory risk should not be confused with our use of annual variables. These variables represent …rm characteristics that represent jump and di¤usive risks, not realized jumps or price changes. They represent the likelihood of jumps and di¤usive price changes upon which market-makers base their approach to setting bid-ask spreads. As mentioned earlier, these characteristics are indeed estimated using higher frequency data (daily).
Data
We obtain from CRSP daily stock prices, volume, shares outstanding, and market-capitalization for all stocks listed on the NYSE and NASDAQ between 2002-2011. We start our sample in 2002, as this is the last year of the minimum tick rules, which imposed regulatory constraints on minimum bid-ask spreads and price changes. For these stocks and years, we also obtain TAQ historical data for bid-ask quotes and calculate their average annual percentage spreads. We calculate average annual turnover rates using volume and shares outstanding data for each stock.
In our …nal sample, we eliminate all …rm-years with less than 245 observations per year, and those with bid-ask spreads (percent) that were larger than 50% or negative. We also eliminate securities that did not have data on market capitalization for year t in the CRSP database; this excludes non-stock securities listed on exchanges. We end up with 9,088 di¤erent stocks between 2002-2011, and 61,299 stock-year observations.
We calibrate the return-process model speci…ed in Equation (1) for daily returns and obtain for each stock i and year t a vector of parameters
that characterizes the jump-di¤usion return process. To gauge the consistency of our calibration with the realized historical data, we compare our model-implied daily-return variance (V t i as speci…ed in Equation (3)) with the realized daily return-variance, measured over the corresponding year t. We denote the realized variance by e V t i . For more than 90% of our sample, the ratio
falls between 0.8 and 1.2, implying that there was a good …t between our predicted variance and the actual variance, i.e., no more than 20% deviation.
Finalizing our sample, we eliminate all estimates with extreme values, that is, the highest and lowest 1% for all parameters of the vector t i . We also eliminate all observations that do not satisfy the condition
11 After applying these additional …lters, our …nal sample contains 44,171 stock-years observations. The average jump size in our sample is 3% (in absolute values), and the average jump frequency is 16%. These estimates are comparable to estimates obtained by prior studies (e.g., Todorov and Bollerslev, 2010; Tauchen and Zhou, 2011) .
is around 29%. Average values for the di¤usive and jump components are of the same order of magnitude, 18% and 20%, respectively, and their medians are around 17%. 12 Their similar orders of magnitude are also maintained throughout their quintile distribution.
Panel B reports quintile breakdown of average bid-ask spreads across our sample. They are around 1.8% on average with a standard deviation of 2.5%. The median bid-ask spread is around 85 basis points.
Results
Univariate Analysis -Sorted Portfolios
As a …rst step we provide a univariate analysis in a portfolio framework. We explore the impact each volatility component has on illiquidity while controlling for the levels of the other volatility component. In Table ( 2) Panel A, we sort all stocks in our sample for each year t on their jump-driven variance portion V j and form …ve equally weighted portfolios. The …rst quintile portfolio contains stocks with the lowest jump volatility component for a given year, and the …fth quintile contains stocks with the highest jump volatility component. We denote these portfolios by j = 1; :::; 5. Then, for each year t, we further sort each of the …ve portfolios j = 1; :::; 5 on their di¤usion-driven variance component V d to form additional …ve equally weighted subportfolios per portfolio rank j. The …rst quintile subportfolio contains stocks with the lowest V d and the …fth quintile subportfolio contains stocks with the highest V d . This way, we create for each year t and jump portfolio rank j …ve subgroups of stocks ranked from 1-5 sorted on V d . We denote these subportfolios by d j = 1; :::; 5. We then calculate average bid-ask spreads for each subport…lo in year t + 1.
As seen in Panel A, going up the ranking in the di¤usive volatility component while holding jumps levels …xed has a (small) negative e¤ect on bid-ask spreads. Overall the di¤erence in average bid-ask spreads between high di¤usive and low di¤usive volatility portfolios are all negative and around 65 basis points, with high t-statistics ranging from 7:76 to 13:10. The only exception is for the highest jump portfolio that exhibits a very small and insigni…-cant di¤erence in bid-ask spreads between its high and low di¤usive volatility portfolios. We provide a graphic presentation of these results in Figure 1 Panel A.
In Panel B of Table ( 2) we repeat the same procedure the other way around. That is, we sort all stocks on the di¤usive variance component V d and then further sort each di¤usive portfolio d = 1; :::; 5 on the jump variance component. This way, we create for each year t and di¤usive portfolio rank d …ve subportfolios ranked from 1-5 sorted on V j . We denote these subportfolios by j d = 1; :::; 5. We then calculate the average bid-ask spread for each portfolio (in year t + 1).
A very di¤erent picture arises for this analysis. As seen in Panel B, bid-ask spreads increase when going up the ranking in the jump volatility component while controlling for di¤usive volatility levels. This holds true for all levels of di¤usive volatility. The di¤erence in means for bid-ask spreads between high-and low-jump volatility portfolios are all positive and range from 164 to 278 basis point, much larger than for those obtained for the di¤usive case in absolute terms reported Panel A. Moreover, t-statistics are much higher for the jump case and range from 18.94 to 27.57, indicating much higher statistical signi…cance. We provide a graphic presentation of these results in Figure 1 Panel B.
Fama-MacBeth Regressions: Total Volatility and Illiquidity
In the …rst step, we replicate the results from previous studies to con…rm that total volatility has a positive impact on illiquidity in our sample. Table ( 3) reports Fama-MacBeth regression results based on the model speci…ed in Equation (4). We estimate Equation (4) twice, once without controlling for turnover and again controlling for turnover (Models 1 and 2, respectively). Total variance indeed has a positive and signi…cant impact on bid-ask spreads under both speci…cations. Under the …rst speci…cation, the coe¢ cient estimate for total variance is 2.19 with a t-statistic of 5.52. Under the second speci…cation, the coe¢ cient estimate increases to 3.44 with a t-statistic of 6.02. The turnover coe¢ cient is negative, as expected, consistent with prior studies that argue that higher trading activity decreases illiquidity. The coe¢ cient for total volatility becomes more positive since here we explicitly account for the negative impact turnover has on illiquidity, capturing only the pure relation between total volatility and illiquidity and ignoring its indirect negative e¤ect through turnover.
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Market capitalization also has a negative and statistically signi…cant e¤ect as expected, since larger …rms tend to have lower trading costs. These …ndings are consistent with prior studies that found a positive relation between volatility and illiquidity costs. (See Stoll, 1978b , 2000 Pastor and Stambaugh, 2003) . 13 We con…rmed that total volatility and turnover have a signi…cant positive correlation. When we regressed
Turnover on Total Volatility we received a positive coe¢ cient of 161.5 for Total Volatility with t-statistic of 5.51.
Fama-MacBeth Regressions: Volatility Components and Illiquidity
In the next step, we decompose total volatility into its jump and di¤usive driven components. Table (4) reports Fama-MacBeth regression results for the regression speci…ed in Equation (5), which explicitly models separate e¤ects for each component. Again, we estimate this equation twice, without controlling for turnover and then controlling for turnover (Models 1 and 2, respectively). The estimated e¤ects of jump and di¤usive volatilities are very di¤erent under both speci…cations. Under the …rst speci…cation, the jump-driven variance coe¢ cient is 4:25, and the di¤usive one is 1:87, and both are statistically signi…cant with t-statistics of 7:84 and 4:14, respectively. This implies that the two volatility components a¤ect illiquidity very di¤erently: the jump component positively and the di¤usive negatively. These coe¢ cients imply that an increase of one standard deviation in the jump-driven volatility component increases bid-ask spreads by approximately 30 basis points, whereas an equivalent increase in the di¤usive volatility component decreases bid-ask spreads by approximately 10 basis points. However, the negative e¤ect of di¤usive volatility might be attributable to its indirect e¤ect on illiquidity through increasing turnover, as discussed before.
14 To explicitly account for turnover e¤ects, we use Model 2. Under this speci…cation the jumpdriven variance coe¢ cient increases to 5.15, while the di¤usion-driven variance coe¢ cient dramatically drops to 0.02. Moreover, the jump-component coe¢ cient has a substantially higher statistical signi…cance, with a t-statistic of 8.30 compared to 0.04 for the di¤usion component. These coe¢ cients imply that an increase of one standard deviation in the jump-driven volatility component increases bid-ask spreads by approximately 40 basis points, whereas an equivalent increase in the di¤usive volatility component has negligible economic e¤ects. The turnover coe¢ cient is negative, similar to that obtained for total volatility in Table ( 3). This implies that the entire relation between di¤usive volatility and illiquidity is indirect, and it is completely driven by turnover. In contrast, the relation between jump volatility and illiquidity is direct and unrelated to increased trading activity. Finally, …rm size maintains a very similar e¤ect compared to those obtained in Table ( 3) and Table (4) Model 1. The Fama-MacBeth average R 2 is 50%, indicating a strong explanatory power for our model.
14 We con…rmed that turnover has a di¤erent correlation with each volatility component. When we regressed Turnover on Jump Volatility and Di¤ usive Volatility we received a (small) negative coe¢ cient of -78.8 for Jump Volatility with t-statistic of -1.71. On the other hand, for Di¤ usive Volatility we received a large positive coe¢ cient of 787.9 with t-statistic of 8.12. These results are consistent with those previously obtained in the literature (e.g., Giot et al., 2010) .
In summary, our results indicate that the structure of volatility matters for bid-ask spreads beyond raw levels of volatility. Moreover, the jump-driven volatility component almost exclusively drives the relation between volatility and illiquidity, while the di¤usive component has a negligible e¤ect. The only e¤ect di¤usive volatility has is indirect and driven by the increased trading it generates.
An alternative yet equivalent way to state our results is that controlling for total volatility, the jump volatility component has a strong positive e¤ect on illiquidity whereas the di¤usive component has a negative e¤ect. Although this analysis is exactly equivalent to the one carried out thus far using Model 2, for convenience and ease of presentation reasons, we report estimation results for the e¤ects jump and di¤usive volatility have on illiquidity when controlling for total volatility. These results are presented in the last two columns of Table  ( 3), using Model 2a and 2b respectively. The coe¢ cient estimates in Model 2a and 2b match their implied values from the coe¢ cient estimates in Model 2. 
Controlling for Information Asymmetry
In the previous sections we showed that the association between volatility and liquidity is driven almost exclusively by the jump component. Alternatively stated, our results show that the jump source of volatility is associated with liquidity, controlling for total volatility. As discussed in the introduction, because the structure of volatility is governed by the information environment of the …rm, this result provides a link between the information environment and liquidity. Nevertheless, prior literature has already established a link between the information environment of the …rm and liquidity through information asymmetry. Our predictions suggest that the information environment is likely to create observable di¤erences in liquidity even for …rms with identical information asymmetry (or even in the absence of information asymmetry).
We test this predication in two di¤erent ways. In the …rst way, we simply add a control variable to Equation (5) to account for levels information asymmetry. In the second way, we sort our sample into …ve quintiles of information asymmetry and re-estimate Equation (5) in each quintile. Our empirical proxy for information asymmetry is the probability of informed trade (PIN). PIN is based on the imbalance between buy and sell orders among investors and is therefore technically unrelated to bid-ask spread. The results from these tests are presented in Table (5) . The …rst column presents estimation results for Equation (5) when controlling for information asymmetry. The results reveal that although PIN is, as expected, positively associated with bid-ask spreads, all our other results remain qualitatively unchanged (as in Table 4 ). Columns 2-6 present estimation results for Equation (5) for each information asymmetry quintile from low to high separately. The coe¢ cient for jump volatility is positive with high t-statistics in all quintiles, while the coe¢ cient for di¤usive volatility is mostly negative and has very low t-statistics. Taken together, these results suggest that the relation between each source of volatility and liquidity remains unaltered even for …rms with similar levels of information asymmetry. 
Robustness -Testing for Reverse Causality
By de…nition, illiquid assets are subject to greater jump risk as thin trading means infrequent transactions where each transaction is more likely to generate large price impacts. Put di¤erently, "technical jumps"can be generated through prices that bounce between bid and ask quotes for wide bid-ask spreads.
To mitigate the concern that this reverse causality drives our results, we test for the e¤ect of increasing the jump volatility component while controlling for turnover rates. By construction, stocks with high turnover rates do not exhibit thin trading. Therefore, we …rst sort all stocks in each year on turnover rates and form …ve di¤erent portfolios, from low to high. Then, for each portfolio level, we repeat our second method of double sorting on total variance and jump-driven variance and then averaging across all years and all total volatility ranks k. This process is carried out for each of the …ve turnover portfolios. Therefore we have a …ve-by-…ve portfolio ranking sorted on turnover level and jump-driven volatility level. We report the results in Table ( 6).
Our results show that the dominance of the jump volatility component is maintained in all portfolios: higher jump-driven portfolios always exhibit higher average bid-ask spreads, for all …ve turnover portfolios. Formal t-tests for the di¤erence between high and low jumpportfolios all reject the null hypothesis that the corresponding average bid-ask spreads are 16 These tests do not suggest that the structure of volatility does not a¤ect liquidity through information asymmetry as well. Nor do these tests suggest that the information environment does not a¤ect liquidity through information asymmetry. These result simply suggest that the information environment can a¤ect liquidity through its e¤ect on volatility structure independently of the e¤ects the information environment has on liquidity through information asymmetry.
identical per turnover portfolio, with t-statistics ranging from 8. 26-10.76 . This suggests that jump volatility plays an important role even for stocks that do not su¤er from thin trading.
Volatility Components and Liquidity Risk
A number of studies have shown that liquidity levels are risky (e.g., Pastor and Stambaugh, 2003; Sadka, 2006) . 17 Given our …ndings about the di¤erential e¤ects jump and di¤usive volatilities have on liquidity, to the extent that some of this relation is driven by systematic factors, it is possible that these components would play di¤erent roles in determining liquidity risk.
Acharya and Pedersen (2005) use a liquidity-adjusted CAPM model to provide a uni…ed framework that accounts for the various e¤ects liquidity risk has on asset prices. In their model, the CAPM "beta" is decomposed into the standard market beta and additional three liquidity-related betas, representing three di¤erent channels through which liquidity risk operates: (1) the sensitivity of the stock's illiquidity to the market's illiquidity; (2) the sensitivity of the stock's return to the market's illiquidity; and (3) the sensitivity of the stock's illiquidity to the market's return. Investors demand higher risk premiums for stocks that su¤er more in times of stress, times in which they also exhibit large losses in wealth. That is, investors should worry about a security's performance and tradability both in market downturns and when liquidity "dries up".
While Acharya and Pedersen's (2005) model gives clear predictions as to the e¤ects these three sensitivities have on stocks'expected returns, they recognize that they do not explain why di¤erent stocks possess those di¤erent sensitivity characteristics. Rather, they merely estimate the sensitivities and treat them as given. Our framework allows for a deeper insight into the heterogeneity of these characteristics, which complements their analysis.
The relation between jump volatility and two of the liquidity risk channels described above is straightforward. The …rst and third channels describe the comovement in individual stock illiquidity with market illiquidity and market returns, respectively, over time. Since we showed that the jump-volatility component is the dominant driver behind illiquidity, it is possible that it would also be the main driver determining its commonality with the other two variables.
The second channel, which describes the comovement between returns and market liquidity, might also be driven by jump risk. Firms with higher jump risk are more likely to experience large losses (i.e., a negative jump) when markets "dry up" for lack of funding, thus increasing the commonality between returns and market liquidity. Furthermore, trading costs for individual stocks might also increase in an illiquid environment and thus put downward pressure on prices. Since liquidity costs are driven by jump risk, it is possible that these …rms with higher jump risk that are more likely to experience price declines in illiquid markets.
To test these possibilities we follow Acharya and Pedersen (2005) and construct equivalent measures for the three liquidity-related betas. If indeed jump-risk is the dominant driver behind illiquidity, it is possible that higher values for all three liquidity-related betas are correlated with higher measures for jump-risk. In contrast, di¤usive-risk should be less correlated with these betas.
Speci…cally, let 1L ; 2L and 3L denote the three liquidity related betas, respectively. Following Acharya and Pedersen (2005), we de…ne
where L To estimate these 's we used the Sadka (2006) variable-permanent liquidity factor as our measure for aggregate market liquidity, which is the one associated with information driven price changes. For individual stock liquidity measures we used the (negative) value of monthly average TAQ bid-ask spreads per stock.
18 All monthly return data and aggregate market return data were obtained from CRSP. As in Acharya and Pedersen (2005) we expect all three betas to be positive, that is, the higher the beta the larger liquidity risk is.
For each month between 2002-2011 we used a 60-month rolling window to estimate the three covariances (betas) per stock i as in Equations (6). 19 Then, for each beta we ran a FamaMacBeth regression on our two measures of jump and di¤usive volatility, V d i;t and V j i;t . That is,
where, k is 1L; 2L or 3L. We also included (the log of) the …rm's market capitalization as a control variable. We report our results in Table (7) . 18 We used their negative value to convert them from measures of illiquidity (costs) to measure of liquidity, to be consistent with the Sadka (2006) framework and liquidity factors. 19 In practice, instead of using simple covariances we used OLS regressions to estimate these three 's, where each was obtained as the estimated coe¢ cient.
As seen in Table (7) , the jump volatility component has a positive and statistically signi…cant e¤ect for all three betas. On the other hand the di¤usive component has a (non-signi…cant) negative e¤ect. That is, only jump volatility increases liquidity risk while di¤usive volatility does not.
Furthermore, to enhance our analysis we followed Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) to take a deeper look into the factors determining 2L i;t , which measures the relation between returns and market liquidity. They …rst obtained 2L using a richer speci…cation based on a three factor Fama-French (FF) model. Speci…cally,
where M KT t , SM B t and HM L t are the regular FF factors (market, small minus big, and high minus low, respectively) and L M t is the aggregate liquidity factor. Therefore, 2L is the coe¢ cient for the aggregate liquidity factor. They also assumed that 2L i;t has the following linear form,
where Z i;t 1 is a vector of characteristic variables that a¤ect 2L i;t . Therefore, Equation (8) can be rephrased as,
from which we can de…ne the following residual,
that can be expressed as,
Namely, e i;t is the share of returns that remains unexplained by all regular factors and is a¤ected only by liquidity.
Estimating 0 2 allows for gauging the contribution each characteristic in Z has on liquidity risk, 2L , as de…ned in Equation (9). In the context of our analysis, we used jump volatility and di¤usive volatility as two characteristics in Z and our goal is to measure how each characteristic a¤ects
We report our regression results for Equation (10) in Table ( On the other hand, the interactions between the di¤usive component and the liquidity factors are non-signi…cant. That is, this richer framework for the liquidity measure also supports the unique role jump volatility plays: given the structure of 2L i;t speci…ed in Equation (9), only the jump volatility component increases liquidity risk.
In summary, these …ndings provide further support for the dominant role jump volatility plays in the relation between volatility and liquidity. Not only liquidity levels are driven by the jump component but liquidity risk as well. We do not …nd a similar signi…cant e¤ect for the di¤usive component. Finally, this pattern exists in all three channels through which liquidity risk operates.
Conclusions
In our analysis, we delve a deeper look into the di¤erent factors determining the relation between total volatility and illiquidity. Disentangling total volatility into its di¤usive and jump components reveals a more complex picture. We …nd that it is jump volatility that drives the positive relationship, while di¤usive volatility has a negative contribution. These results are maintained at any level of information asymmetry. Moreover, the negative contribution of di¤usive volatility is completely channeled through its e¤ect on increased trading activity (turnover), which in return decreases illiquidity. Therefore, once we account for this trading e¤ect the di¤usive component plays no role.
Finally, we also …nd that the di¤erential e¤ects each volatility component has on illiquidity carry on in the same structural fashion into additional dimensions of illiquidity. That is, each volatility component maintains its type of impact on liquidity risk and liquidity risk premiums.
These …ndings contribute to several di¤erent strands of the academic literature. They further expand our understanding of the determinants of liquidity, particularly in relation to the role volatility plays, and of the way …rms'information environment a¤ects capital markets. Moreover, they enhance our understanding of the mechanisms that drive liquidity risk and liquidity risk premiums. Finally, they shed light on a set of new consequences that jumps create, in addition to a number of previously documented ones, such as their consequences to credit risk, market beta, and stock option pricing.
At the regulatory level, our study provides evidence that implementing accounting policies that encourage more continuous ‡ow of information and disclosure may make sense in order to increase liquidity. Such policies are likely to improve the di¤usive component of volatility, smooth potential surprises, and thus improve liquidity.
Last, we realize that we do not o¤er an explicit theoretical model to gauge the di¤erent e¤ects that jump and di¤usive volatilities have on liquidity. Nevertheless, the theoretical paradigms mentioned in the introduction provide the inspiration for our empirical investigation, which is signi…cant in itself, particularly given the fact that so far no work has been done on the topic. Therefore, our …ndings provide the motivation for further developments of an explicit theoretical model, which is left for future research.
Appendix A: Jumps and the Information Environment
In this appendix we replicate in our sample period (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) the results obtained in our companion study. Panel A of the following table presents regression results for jump volatility on various proxies for information environment and time and …rm …xed e¤ects. The number of analysts covering the …rm, the fact that management provides guidance, and the number of management guidance by the …rm, are all negatively associated with the jump component of total volatility (coe¢ cients of -0.042, -0.178 and -0.023 respectively). The results in Panel B, using a di¤erence in di¤erences with time and …rm …xed e¤ects design, show that a drop in analyst coverage as a result brokerage house closure casually increases jump volatility in the year of the change compared to una¤ected years and …rms (coe¢ cient of 0.039). Taken together and as suggested by our companion study, these results provide con…rmation that the information environment determines the composition of volatility. Merton (1976) , let S t denote a stock price at time t on a …ltered probability space ( ; F; (F t ) ; P ), which is assumed to satisfy the following stochastic di¤erential equation:
where and 2 denote the instantaneous mean and variance of the stock return in the absence of jumps, and W t is a Wiener process. Furthermore, N t is a Poisson process with intensity > 0, and Z is the log-normal jump amplitude with ln Z v N ( ; 2 ) such that
We postulate that W t ,N t , and Z t are mutually independent. The parameter vector is = ( ; 2 ; ; ; 2 ) 0 , where and 2 represent the mean and variance of the jump size of stock returns.
Since the Brownian motion and the Poisson process of jump events are independent, the total return variance can be decomposed into
which is the sum of the di¤usion-related variance and the jump-related variance. We denote
as the respective variances. Furthermore, following Merton (1976) and Navas (2003) , these variances can be expressed in terms of the respective basic process parameters as
which allow for easily calculating these values based on the parameter vector .
Following Ait-Sahalia (2004) , under the assumptions speci…ed above, the transition density f ln S of ln S t can be expressed by
where f ln Sj Nt=0 and f ln Sj Nt=1 represent the transition densities of ln S t , conditioning on N t = 0 and N t = 1 jumps between two sampling points, respectively, and t > 0 denotes the time distance between sampling points. Since
additional jumps between two sampling points are neglected. Closed form expressions for the conditional densities are given by
where
with k 2 f0; 1g. Based on a sample of n stock returns ln s 1 ; :::; ln s n , the resulting likelihood estimate b of is computed numerically aŝ
Figure 1
BID-ASK SPREADS AND VOLATILITY COMPONENTS: SORTED PORTFOLIOS
This figure is a graphic presentation of Table ( We …rst sorted all stocks in each year into …ve di¤erent portfolios, from low to high. Then, for each portfolio level, we repeated our second method of double sorting on total variance and jump-driven variance and then averaging across all years and all total volatility ranks k per jump rank. This process was carried out for each of the …ve turnover portfolios separately. Then, for each jump portfolio level and turnover level, we calculated average bid-ask spreads in period t + 1. We also report the di¤erences in bid-ask spreads between the highest and lowest portfolios and their t statistics. 
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